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DOES BOGART STILL GET SCALE?
RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Douglas G. Baird∗
Benjamin Kaplan’s An Unhurried View of Copyright remains the locus classicus of scholarship on intellectual property, and it is useful
to recall the central theme of that book. Kaplan focused upon the
need to fashion doctrine in a way that preserved the public domain:
If man has any natural rights, not the least must be a
right to imitate his fellows, and thus to reap where he has
not sown. Education, after all, proceeds from a kind of
mimicry, and progress, if it is not entirely an illusion, depends on a generous indulgence of copying.
Kaplan believed that there would always be a frontier that marks the
boundary between privately owned intellectual property and the
open wilderness that is the public domain. While we want to protect
creators, we need a large public domain as well.
Many follow Kaplan and believe that preserving the public domain is a principal goal of intellectual property law. In this paper,
however, I ask whether this still makes sense. Perhaps the principal
problem is no longer one of preserving the public domain, but understanding how the law of intellectual property should function in a
world in which increasingly our cultural icons and symbols are privately owned. To a very large extent, Kaplan’s frontier may no
longer exist.
In a trivia contest, I once missed the following question: About
what movie producer from the Golden Age of Hollywood was it often said that when he didn’t like one of his actors, he would just cut
him into little pieces? I answered with the name of the most abusive
Hollywood producer that came to mind. (At this producer’s garish
and unusually well-attended funeral, one mourner whispered to another, “It just goes to show you. You give the people what they want
∗
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and they will come.”) This was not the answer they were seeking,
however. It was a trick question.
The answer they wanted was Walt Disney. This answer is correct
only for the most literal among us. Celluloid is easily cut. But Disney
loved all his stars, and they never let him down. Indeed, even though
Mickey Mouse has not been in a movie for years, he remains eager to
do another picture. And the best part, from Disney’s perspective, is
that Mickey is still under contract.
Compare Mickey with another figure from Hollywood’s Golden
Age—Humphrey Bogart. Like Mickey, Humphrey Bogart has not
starred in a movie for many years. But Moore’s Law applies in Hollywood as elsewhere. Recall Moore’s Law. Computer chips get twice
as fast and cost half as much every 18 months. The Digital Revolution
has already made the motion picture industry a radically different
place. Jurassic Park gave us digitally realized dinosaurs. In the latest
Star Wars movie, most of the sets were computer-generated. Tom
Hanks shook John Kennedy’s hand in Forest Gump. Nancy Marchand’s final appearance on The Sopranos came, with computer assistance, some months after she died.
Bogart himself did a commercial with Elton John in the early
1990s and had a cameo role with Steve Martin in Dead Men Don’t
Wear Plaid. In these efforts, old clips of Bogart were reinserted into
new footage, but we are not far from being able to start from scratch.
We shall soon be able to produce a movie in which the drops of rain
on Bogart’s trench-coat, his voice, eye-brows, twitch, and every distinctive facial gesture can be computer-generated and made to fit any
scene a screenwriter can dream up. Indeed, Bogart has already appeared with Marilyn Monroe in Rendez-vous in Montreal, a 7-minute
short.
In other words, some time soon, Bogart, like Mickey, could do
another film. This raises the natural question. Mickey still works for
Disney, but what about Bogart? Who owns the rights to him? Bogart
is dead, but does he still get scale? There is already a literature on the
question of intellectual property rights and “reanimation” as it is
called.1
The leading work here is Joseph J. Beard, Casting Call at Forest Law:
The Digital Resurrection of Deceased Entertainers—A 21st Century Challenge for Intellectual Property Law, 8 High Technology Law Journal 101
(1993).
1
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People come to this problem from many different directions. I
come to it because it is emblematic of what I believe is going to be the
central problem in our law of intellectual property. I shall begin by
focusing on a narrow hypothetical. Then I shall set out the known
landmarks in the legal terrain. Finally, I shall suggest how we should
find our way in this undiscovered country.
Let us assume that we are Warner Brothers and we hold the
copyright to all the motion pictures in which Bogart appeared and to
all the novels on which the movies are based. We have decided to
make a sequel to the Maltese Falcon. We would like to have Bogart
take the lead role of Sam Spade. We want to bring back once more
the Bogart persona, the man on the silver screen who wore a trench
coat better than anyone. The icon that was rediscovered at the Brattle
Street cinema in the 1950s and has been on a poster in every college
dorm ever since. Can we do this without getting permission from
Bogart’s heirs?
There are at least three possible answer to the question of who
controls the rights to this Bogart persona. First, Bogart’s heirs may
control it. One can argue that we can no more cast Bogart in a movie
without getting permission of his heirs than we can cast Clint Eastwood in the part without getting his permission. Second, you can argue Warner Brothers already has the rights. The Bogart persona is
entirely captured in the films. The Bogart persona is simply the Sam
Spade of the Maltese Falcon, the Philip Marlowe of The Big Sleep, and
the Richard Blaine of Casablanca. You can’t separate the dancer from
the dance. Finally, you can argue that this icon is part of our culture
and is in the public domain, free for any of us to use.
Let us now take a survey of the relevant legal landscape. We can
start by turning to first principles. The foundation of intellectual
property law rests on the idea that we need to give people the incentive to create in the first instance. Indeed, this idea is in the Constitution. The Constitution gives Congress the power: “To promote the
Progress of Science and the useful arts by securing for limited Times .
. . to Authors . . . the exclusive Right . . . to their Writings”
The Copyright Clause is one of the few provisions of the Constitution that explains why it exists. Congress has the power to give authors the exclusive right to their writings in order to promote science
and the useful arts. As Benjamin Kaplan reminded us more than three
decades ago, we give exclusive rights for a specific reason, and we
have to worry about granting rights that interfere with the ability of
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others to create new work. Hence, copyright gives only limited protection.
We give artists rights only to their original “expression.” Ideas
and facts remain in the public domain, where they are free for anyone to use. The principal job we face in any given case is figuring out
what is an “idea” that anyone is free to copy and what is “expression” that the creator controls. The idea-expression distinction has
served us tolerably well. It is sometimes vague and uncertain in its
application, but it can give us some clean answers.
As an illustration, let me remind you of another classic of film
noir. Released in 1988, it is also a detective story set in 1940s California. As the posters for the film told us, it is a steamy love triangle between “a man, a woman, and a rabbit.” The people who made Who
Framed Roger Rabbit? did not have to get permission from those who
held the rights to the Maltese Falcon, The Big Sleep or Chinatown. Doing
a detective story in 1940s California is something anyone can do. It’s
a genre. Not only has it been done before, but it provides merely the
general architecture for the story. Hence, it is an unprotectable
“idea,” not copyrightable “expression.”
For the same reason, using cartoon characters drawn in three dimensions who interact in a movie seamlessly with human actors is
also an idea, rather than an expression. Warner Brothers did not need
Disney’s permission to pair Bugs Bunny with Michael Jordan in Space
Jam, even though they may have taken the idea from Roger Rabbit.
But Disney does get copyright protection for its original “expression.” Combining the 1940s detective story genre with the conceit
that the cartoon characters in Hollywood films really existed and
lived in their own segregated neighborhoods, may itself be protected
by copyright. More relevant for us, the character of Roger Rabbit is
protectable “expression” under copyright law. If you want to do a
movie starring Roger Rabbit, you have to get Disney’s permission.
The idea-expression distinction is one of the main landmarks in
our landscape and it does give us some purchase on our own problem. Take the character of Sam Spade (as opposed to the Bogart persona). This is the same as asking about doing a sequel to the Maltese
Falcon, but casting someone other than Bogart in the role of Sam
Spade. The character of Sam Spade seems protectable expression just
like Roger Rabbit. For example, there has been a case holding that the
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character of Freddy Krueger in Nightmare on Elm Street is copyrightable, quite apart from the actor who played him.2
There are differences to be sure between Sam Spade on the one
hand and Roger Rabbit and Freddy Krueger on the other. A cartoon
rabbit is visually distinct in a way a character in a novel or movie is
not. Freddy’s glove is unique, unlike Sam Spade’s trench coat. To
protect Sam Spade, you have to distinguish him from the generic
1940s private detective. But you can make distinctions between a
general stereotype and a particular incarnation of it. There is the
stereotype of the 1960s jet-setting bachelor spy that is in the public
domain, but the characters James Bond, Napoleon Solo, Maxwell
Smart, and Austin Powers are all protected by copyright. You cannot,
however be 100% sure about this or another other question of intellectual property. Indeed, there is a Ninth Circuit case involving the
Maltese Falcon that asserts that the character of Sam Spade is not
copyrightable.3
It’s an old case, however, and the person on the other side was
Dashiell Hammett, the author of the novel on which the film is based.
Warner Brothers argued that, because it acquired the copyright from
Hammett, it alone controlled the rights to a sequel. The question was
ultimately one of contract and the discussion of the copyrightability
of the character of Sam Spade may be best seen as dictum. Notwithstanding this case, I think we can say that Sam Spade is protected by
copyright and that we, Warner Brothers, own it. But we are not
home-free by any means. We have concluded only that we have the
exclusive rights to do a sequel to the Maltese Falcon. That doesn’t tell
us whether we need anyone’s permission to cast Bogart in the lead.
Let’s identify one more landmark. Actors and celebrities have
what is known as a “right of publicity.” They have the right to control their name and likeness and prevent them from being used to
sell goods. The right of publicity in this context functions like a
trademark. You can’t use Bette Midler to sell your cars without getting her permission.4 The right of publicity doctrine suggests that
See New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertelsmann Music Group, Inc., 693 F.
Supp. 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
3 See Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954).
4 See Midler v. Ford Motor Co. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
2
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there are some uses of Bogart’s name and likeness that are subject to
intellectual property protection. I can’t make trench coats and use
Bogart as my model.
I have to make a qualification here, however. There is an important difference between Bette Midler and Humphrey Bogart. Bogart
is dead. Is your ability to control how others use your name and likeness a property right that you can pass along to your heirs?5 To put it
in legal terms, is the right of publicity is descendable? This technical
legal question is one of state law and the answer varies according to
the jurisdiction you are in. But let us assume that we are in a jurisdiction where it is descendable and Bogart’s heirs could assert his right
of publicity. They could and stop us from using Bogart’s likeness to
promote trench coats.
But this still doesn’t answer our question. We are not proposing
to use Bogart to sell trench coats. We are talking about using the Bogart persona in a movie. Does the right of publicity apply in this context? The paradigm case here is Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting.6 Zacchini is a human cannonball. He goes around from one state
fair to another shooting himself out of a cannon. A local news program in Ohio films his act and broadcasts it. Zacchini sues claiming
that his act is entitled to intellectual property protection. You can’t
appropriate his act and show it on television regardless of whether
you are connecting him to the sponsorship or the sale of any product.
It seems only a small step from protecting Hugo Zacchini, the man
who wears the satin cape and defies death, to protecting the Bogart
persona, the man who wears the trench coat and casts a cold eye. But
it is a step we want to be careful about taking.
We are talking about taking a film persona, that part of the Bogart
style that is different from the character of Rick in Casablanca, Philip
Marlowe in the Big Sleep, and Sam Spade in the Maltese Falcon. But
what is this exactly? More to the point, what is it that is independent
of what Warner Brothers owns by virtue of its copyrights in Bogart’s
movies? Let me give you a recent case that illustrates this problem. A
restaurant chain obtains a license from the producers of the television
5 See Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978). The
descendability of the right is recognized in about half the states, see Thomas
McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy §61[B] (1992).
6 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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sit-com Cheers to build bars that look like the set of the show. The
bars include dummies that replicate two of the regular characters,
Norm and Cliff. The actors who play these characters sue, claiming
that their rights of publicity are infringed.7
They can claim no copyright in the characters of Norm and Cliff.
The producer of the series holds the copyright to the characters. But
the actors point out that the dummies bear a physical resemblance to
them. This physical resemblance, they argue, is distinct from the way
the dummies embody the fictional personas of Norm and Cliff. In
other words, the dummies are not of Norm and Cliff, but of them, as
actors, playing the characters of Norm and Cliff. Copyright law gives
the producers the right to the characters of Norm and Cliff, but it
does not give them the right to continue to use the flesh-and-blood
actors in these roles. Nor does it give them the right to control facsimiles of these actors in these roles. Thus, the argument goes, if the
restaurant wants dummies of Norm and Cliff who look like the actors who played them, it has to strike a deal with the actors as well as
the producers. This line of reasoning identifies for us the first danger
in the landscape. We must be careful about recognizing rights (the
actors’ right to control their personas) that overlap with rights (the
producers’ copyright in the characters) that already exist.
Let me now turn to a second danger. Just as we don’t want to
step upon rights that already exist, we don’t want to intrude upon
what ought to be in the public domain. Return for a moment to Zacchini. The news station still has to be able to report on Zacchini’s act.
How can you do this effectively on the evening news and not “appropriate” his act, at least to some extent?
We have the same problem with the Bogart persona. You can’t
copyright facts any more than ideas. Let us say you want to write a
book about Bogart and the making of the Maltese Falcon. Do you need
anyone’s permission to do this? Absolutely not. In today’s world, the
making of the Maltese Falcon is a dissertation topic. Remember what
they say at universities. Garbage is garbage. But the history of garbage—that’s scholarship! A book on this subject is cinema studies,
it’s history. Copyright law doesn’t prevent you from writing history.
Not only that, but to explain the importance of Bogart the man,
we must capture some of the persona. The man is interesting in large
7

See Wendt v. Host International, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).

8 / Law & Economics Working Paper

part because of the cultural icon he created. What about a television
docudrama about Bogart and the making of the Maltese Falcon? Some
might argue that such a commercial venture is different from serious
history, but I doubt we can draw a line between scholarship and
docudramas for intellectual property purposes any more than we can
say there is a difference between the New York Times and the New
York Post for First Amendment purposes. In short, we can’t craft the
right of publicity in such a way that the heirs of Al Capone can prevent someone from making The Untouchables, as indeed they tried to
do.8
Let us see where we stand. We have identified two dangers with
protecting the Bogart persona. First, the Cheers case suggests that we
risk creating overlapping property regimes. A legal rule that gives
two different people exclusive rights to the same thing doesn’t make
a lot of sense. Second, our concerns about ensuring free access to
facts also make us cautious about extending protection to this kind of
expression.
What conclusion can we draw? Should we say that intellectual
property protection should be limited to what copyright protects
(and thus belongs to Warner Brothers) and to the traditional right of
publicity that functions like a trademark (and belongs to the heirs) so
that everything else is in the public domain?
Let me give you a case that shows why such a world comes with
its own problems. It is the early 1950s. In his spare time, a Rhode Island mechanic with a passion for the Wild West named Victor DeCosta goes around to rodeos, horse shows, and parades. He is a
quick-draw artist. Victor DeCosta can do all sorts of tricks with his
gun. He can spin it, draw it, fire it, and otherwise impress people. He
has a moustache, dresses in black, and wears a black, flat-topped hat
with a silver medal on it. He personifies the nobility of the
gunfighters of the Wild West. A fellow Italian-American recognizes
this by calling him the word in Italian that means “knight”—
Paladino. Victor shortens it to “Paladin” and uses it as his moniker.
To promote himself, he passes out cards with the symbol of a chess
knight printed on it that tells people how to reach him: “Have Gun,
Will Travel. Wire Paladin, North Court St., Cranston, Rhode Island.”
8

See Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1965).
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CBS comes along several years later with a television Western
staring Richard Boone. CBS claims that it knew nothing about Victor
DeCosta. But the name of the show is “Have Gun, Will Travel.”
Moreover, Boone’s character calls himself Paladin, has a moustache,
dresses in black and wears a black flat-topped hat with a silver medal
on it. Similarly, his card has a knight printed on it and also says,
“Have Gun, Will Travel.” There, however, are some differences. The
card, for example, says, “Wire Paladin, San Francisco,” rather than
“Wire Paladin, North Court St., Cranston, Rhode Island.”
DeCosta lost in large part because the court bought CBS’s defense
of coincidence.9The court, however, also resisted giving protection as
a general matter. Protecting a persona free from the book, the movie
screen, or the proscenium arch risks intruding upon the public domain. The DeCosta court, like others, was fearful of what happens if
we expand intellectual property protection too far.
But you also have to consider the consequences if you don’t recognize the rights of those like Victor DeCosta. The persona that DeCosta developed is no different from the core of what intellectual
property law has long protected. Nor is it any different from the Bogart persona. Intellectual property law should give people the incentive to create these and other icons. We should not be afraid that
some of them will be too successful.
Every society has its own stories and its own icons. In ancient
Greece, everything turned on the stories and the characters in the Iliad and the Odyssey. At other times and other places, there were different stories. It may seem odd that the myths and stories that define
a culture could be privately owned. The idea that Aeschylus should
have to negotiate with Homer’s grandchildren seems absurd. But we
have to look at our world and accept its basic features. When we do,
we discover there is a limit to how much we can rely on any legal
rule premised on the existence of a large public domain.
Someone might come up with a mouse that was every bit as good
as Mickey, but it would not be the same. It’s not just any gigantic dog
leading Macy’s Thanksgiving Day parade. It’s Snoopy. In our culture, we have John Wayne, Humphrey Bogart, and Marilyn Monroe.
Hoop Dreams, Mission Impossible, and the Right Stuff. I’ll make you an
See DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 520 F.2d 499 (1st
Cir. 1975).
9
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offer you can’t refuse. Go ahead, make my day. Here’s looking at
you, Kid.
A society defines itself by a limited number of stories. The Iliad
and the Odyssey, Genesis and Exodus, Jack and the Beanstalk and Cinderella. And in our society, our cultural icons are often privately produced and privately owned by large corporations. There is an instinct to fight against this reality. Freedom of expression, the reasoning goes, requires careful guardianship of the public domain. We
don’t want corporate giants like Disney suing people who use
Mickey to engage in social satire now and again. Second, we want to
protect the moral rights of artists, nonwaivable rights to ensure their
artistic integrity against corporate rapacity.
These impulses, however, are ones that we should resist. It is not
necessarily a bad thing that Disney still owns rights to Mickey
Mouse. It gives Disney an incentive to preserve this icon. Without
intellectual property protection, there would be nothing to stop
cheap reproductions, and the dilution and tarnishing that comes with
it. There would be nothing to stop the use of Mickey for any and all
purposes. Our world is not necessarily a better place if anyone can
show Mickey Mouse shooting heroin, as indeed someone has tried.10
We may have little to fear from the Bogart persona being subject
to intellectual property protection. Perhaps, rather than wanting it in
the public domain, we should want someone to own the persona,
promote it, and take care it is well preserved. Bogart’s rights are ultimately no different from those of Lauren Bacall or any other living
actor. To be sure, we can’t let these rights prevent us from seeing
films that have already been made, but if we do not recognize these
kinds of rights, every movie producer could do a movie with
Vanessa Redgrave or Meryl Streep without their permission.
In providing for ownership of an actor’s persona, we should remember why we are doing it. A producer should not be able to cast a
young Sean Connery in a new James Bond movie without having
contracted for the right, either in the past, or in the present with the
Sean Connery of today. But our interpretation of these contracts
should have nothing to do with moral rights, artistic integrity or Sean
10

1978).

See WaltDisneyProductions v. Air Pirates , 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.
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Connery’s sensibilities. Rather, it should be driven by what we know
about markets.
We must do a better job of ensuring that intellectual property
rights are transferable, and that contracts written about them are enforced according to their terms. The problems with the Cheers case
were not with rights of publicity per se, but the failure of the parties
to draft a clear contract and the failure of the courts to give it a fair
reading.
Our world of artistic expression is, for better or worse, a marketplace in which resources are scarce. The right question to ask about
rights of publicity is whether crafting a right in one way rather than
another is going to make the world a better place. Our starting question —Does Bogart Still Get Scale?— should be understood in the
first instance as a question of contract law. We should ask not what
rule best respects Bogart’s artist soul, but rather what rule of contract
interpretation will best promote science and the useful arts, both for
the contracts already written and those that will be. Benjamin Kaplan’s world has changed. Our problem ultimately is no longer one of
preserving the public domain.
Talking about rights of publicity in these terms is not something
likely to gain me favor among literati. They think commodification
and markets don’t belong in their world. But what I have said follows merely from conditions of scarcity and the need to take best advantage of the limited number of icons our culture possesses. Those
in arts and letters surely know that we live in a world in which our
icons are finite. From Mark Twain at the start of the 20th Century to
Tom Wolfe at its end, it is distinctly understood that only one man
may wear the white suit.
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